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How Accurate Is Your Memory on Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction?

How Accurate Is Your Memory on Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction?

"The redundancy of conditional reports, regardless of whether they are thusly disconfirmed, can aid the formation of bogus recollections in a significant extent of individuals."

The above is a statement taken from the Psychological Science research investigation of March 2005 [1] "Memory for Fact, Fiction, and Misinformation" Vol. 16, No. 3.

The not entirely set in stone "Whenever data is distributed, its ensuing amendment doesn't modify individuals' convictions except if they are dubious about the thought processes basic the occasions the reports are about."

This study affirmed what most of US citizens have  6.5 creedmoor ammo had the option to decide on their own which is the more we hear something on the news, the almost certain we are to accept the assertion is valid, whether what we are hearing is truth or fiction.

Such is the situation with weapons of mass annihilation in Iraq. Again and again the general population was prompted by President Bush and V.P. Cheney that Iraq had weapons of mass annihilation that could be utilized against the United States and the best way to kill the danger was for the U.S. to annihilate the Wmd's.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence delivered their bipartisan report named "Post bellum FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS AND LINKS TO TERRORISM AND HOW THEY COMPARE WITH PREWAR ASSESSMENTS" on September 8, 2006.

This report was ready by the 109th Congress, when Republicans held the larger part in both the House and the Senate.

The SSCI council individuals comprised of the accompanying (8) Republicans - Pat Roberts, Chairman, Orrin Hatch, Mike DeWine, Christopher Bond, Trent Lott, Olympia Snowe, Chuck Hagel and Chambliss Saxby and (7) Democrats - John Rockefeller, Vice Chairman, Carl Levin, Dianne Feinstein, Ron Wyden, Evan Bayh, Barbara Mikulski and Russ Feingold, alongside three ex offico's; Bill Frist, Harry Reid, and John Warner. Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, as well as the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee act as ex officio SSCI individuals.

The report recorded the accompanying ends on Iraq Wmd's:

End 1: Postwar discoveries don't uphold the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its atomic weapons program. Data got after the conflict upholds the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's (INR) evaluation in the NIE that the Intelligence Community needed powerful proof that Baghdad had sent off a lucid work to reconstitute its atomic weapons program.

End 2: Postwar discoveries don't uphold the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) appraisal that Iraq's securing of high-strength aluminum tubes was expected for an Iraqi atomic program. The discoveries truly do uphold the evaluations in the NIE of the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) that the aluminum tubes were possible expected for a customary rocket program.

End 3: Postwar discoveries to not help the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) appraisal that Iraq was "enthusiastically attempting to secure uranium metal and yellowcake" from Africa. Post bellum discoveries support the evaluation in the NIE of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) that cases of Iraqi quest for normal uranium in Africa are "profoundly questionable."

End 4: Postwar discoveries don't uphold the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) appraisal that "Iraq has natural weapons" and that "all critical parts of Iraq's hostile organic weapons (BW) program are bigger and further developed than before the Gulf war."

End 5: Postwar discoveries don't uphold the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) appraisal that Iraq had, or at any point created, versatile offices for delivering natural fighting (BW) specialists.

End 6: Concerns existed inside the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIUA) Directorate of Operations (DO) preceding the conflict about the believability of the portable organic weapons program source code-named CURVE BALL. The worries were based, to some degree, on questions raised by the unfamiliar insight administration that dealt with CURVE BALL and a third help. The Committee has no data that these worries were passed on to policymakers, including individuals from the U.S. Congress, preceding the conflict. The Committee is proceeding to explore issues with respect to prewar worries about CURVE BALL'S validity.

End 7: Postwar discoveries don't uphold the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) appraisals that Iraq "has substance weapons" or "is extending its compound industry to help synthetic weapons (CW) creation."

End 8: Postwar discoveries support the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) appraisal that Iraq had rockets which surpassed United Nation (UN) range limits. The discoveries don't uphold the evaluation that Iraq probably held an incognito power of SCUD variation short reach long range rockets (SRBMs).

End 9: Postwar discoveries don't uphold the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) evaluations that Iraq had a formative program for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) "likely planned to convey natural specialists" or that a work to obtain U.S. planning programming "firmly recommends that Iraq is money management the utilization of these UAV's for missions focusing on the United States." Postwar discoveries support the perspective on the Air Force, joined by DIA and the Army, in a NIE distributed in January 2003 that Iraq's UAV's were fundamentally expected for observation.

Data on dangers to the United States is currently given to our chiefs by at least one of the accompanying organizations inside the Intelligence Community:

· Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

· Focal Intelligence Agency (CIA)

· Public safety Agency (NSA)

· Protection Intelligence Agency (DIA)

· Public Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

· Public Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Also, the DOS, DOD, DOJ, FBI, DEA, DHS, DOT, DOE and all parts of the military contribute data on insight.

The race to judgment on Iraq has cost this nation truly. Large number of U.S. troops lost their lives battling in Iraq [4,423], while many thousands were injured [31,942]. Mates and youngsters were left to fight all alone while our soldiers went charging off toward the distant horizon to go after a country that we should not be being in, significantly less going after. Billions of dollars [$616 billion through June of 2008] of our assessment dollars have been spent on military activities in Iraq that could and ought to have been spent in this nation refreshing our disintegrating framework.

CRS arranged a report in June of 2008 [RS22926] demonstrating current year costs as well as consistent dollars.

A careless survey of the numbers will show that as of June 2008 we had previously spent more in Iraq, than what the other five contentions cost joined.

Numerous different nations all over the planet helped us in our battle against WMD's and many their soldiers were killed or potentially injured also. Assuming you add the countless regular people that were killed as well as mangled in Iraq and the misfortunes that nation took at our hands, the numbers are cosmic.

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